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I
Introduction
The music recording industry today is fundamentally broken.
Artists are in open revolt against the labels, because the labels have
used their overwhelming bargaining strength to force the artists into
standard industry contracts that are clearly oppressive and unjust. As
Senator Orrin Hatch aptly put it: “this is the only industry in which
after you pay off the mortgage the bank still owns the house.”1
The recording industry’s use of a standard industry-wide contract
has forced artists into a position that some have said amounts to
professional slavery.2 The artist Prince went so far as trading in his
name for an unpronounceable symbol in 1993 to protest his
relationship with his label at the time, Warner Brothers.3 During the
rest of his contract with Warner Brothers, Prince (or The Artist
Formerly Known as Prince) took to scribbling the word “slave” on his
face during appearances.4
The standard industry contract is set up in such a way that a label
can make a profit off an album, while the artist is left indebted to the
label on the very same album.5 In addition, the contract requires the
artist to sign over all authorship rights in the work to the label.6
Currently, the major label working environment leaves an estimated
99.6 percent of artists indebted to their labels.7 Compounding the
problem, an estimated 75 percent of releases from the major labels
are not even in print, leaving artists with a debt they have no means

1. Recording Artists Coalition, Contractual Issues, available at
<http://www.artistsagainstpiracy.com/contracts.html> (accessed Sept. 25, 2001).
2. Stan Soocher, They Fought the Law: Rock Music Goes to Court 46 (Schirmer
Books 1999); California State Senate Select Committee on the Entertainment Industry
Hearing (Calgov Sept. 5, 2001) (tv broadcast) [hereinafter Senate Select Comm.].
3. Pam Sitt & Melanie McFarland, Sign O’ the Times, Seattle Times H6 (Apr. 26,
2002).
4. Id.
5. Richard Stim, Music Law: How to Run Your Band’s Business ch.14, 8-9 (Nolo
Press 1998).
6. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Statement of Ann
Chaitovitz <http://www.aftra.org/resources/pr/0901/chaitovitz.html> Clause 1. (accessed
Jan. 12, 2001)[hereinafter Television and Radio Artists].
7. Future of Music Coalition, Letter to California State Assembly Regarding the 7year Statute <http://www.futureofmusic.org/news/CAsenate.cfm> (accessed Jan. 12, 2001).
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of paying back.8 The fans and the labels are harmed by a system
where multi-platinum selling bands, like Hole, have disbanded rather
than ever record again under their contracts.9 In the case of Nirvana,
there was new material recorded just before the death of the band’s
leader, Kurt Cobain, in April of 1994, that almost never saw the light
of day.10 Courtney Love, Cobain’s widow and trustee of his estate,
refused to turn over the master recordings in her possession under the
terms of the band’s original contract.11
The courts have not had an opportunity to hear suits challenging
the conscionability of these contracts, because the labels settle the
suits or renegotiate the contracts when they are faced with an artist
who has the muscle to sue.12 The artists, for their part, accept these
renegotiated contracts even though they leave many of the oppressive
and unconscionable terms in the contract.13 The artists accept these
settlements and renegotiated contracts because the cost both
financially and to their careers makes litigation unpalatable.14
The courts, for their part, have developed a doctrine that could
and should provide relief to the artists. The courts, however, have
not had the opportunity to do so because of drawbacks in the judicial
system.15 Therefore, for the good of the artist, the labels, and the fans,
I propose that Congress step in and pass legislation to prevent these
unfair and oppressive contract clauses.
This Note will examine just a few of the oppressive clauses in the
standard music industry recording contract, and how a court could
and should use its discretion, under the doctrine of unconscionability,
to refuse enforcement of those clauses or the contract as a whole.
After demonstrating that the contract clauses are unconscionable, I
will show how drawbacks in the doctrine of unconscionabilty and the
judicial system have prevented the issue from being heard by courts.
It is because of this reality that I will propose that Congress step in
with legislation regulating these clauses for the benefit of the artists,
the labels, and the fans.
8. Id.
9. Senate Select Comm., supra n. 2.
10. See Id.; Gary Graff, Album release lets band’s fans find ‘Nirvana,’ Plain Dealer E1
(Oct. 29, 2002).
11. Graff, supra n. 10.
12. See MTV, Courtney Love, Universal Music Reach Settlement; Nirvana Material
Freed Up For Release <http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1457846/20020930/story.jhtml>
(accessed Sept. 30, 2002); Soocher, supra n. 2, at 43-63.
13. See Soocher, supra n. 2, at 45.
14. See Id.
15. See Id.
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II
Background
A. The Development of the Doctrine of Unconscionability

Courts developed the discretionary doctrine of unconscionability
to provide relief in those contract situations where the contract is so
unjust that it shocks the conscience of the court and the more specific
doctrines of undue influence, duress, misrepresentation, or fraud are
not applicable.16 In the nineteenth-century case of Hume v. U.S., the
United States Supreme Court endorsed this discretionary doctrine
and described an unconscionable agreement as one that “no man in
his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand and as
no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”17
Originally, the doctrine of unconscionability was used by a court
of equity as a discretionary bar to equitable relief in a contract suit.18
Because it is the function of a court of equity to do justice between
the parties, the court would use this doctrine to decline relief to a
plaintiff that had acted inequitably in the court’s opinion.19
For example, if a party to a contract sued for equitable
relief (such as specific performance) under a contract
that was harsh or unfairly bargained, the court would
refuse to enforce it on the ground that to do so would
offend its conscience.20
This early development of the doctrine, however, was not
available in most contract cases, because contract suits often involve
claims for damages or other relief of law,21 and claims in courts of
equity dealt only with claims asking for specific performance or
injunctive relief prohibiting breach.22 Even after the courts of law and
equity had merged, many courts failed to recognize the doctrine of
unconscionability.23 The courts that did recognize the doctrine would
often only do so in cases that were equitable in nature, and since most
contract cases involve claims for damages or other relief of law, the

16. Brian A. Blum, Contracts: Examples and Explanations § 13.11.1, 365-66 (2d ed.,
Aspen Law & Business 2001).
17. 132 U.S. 406, 415 (1889).
18. Blum, supra n. 16, at § 13.11.2, 366.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at § 2.5, 23.
23. Id. at § 13.11.2, 366.
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doctrine was often unavailable even in those jurisdictions that
recognized it.24
This all changed when the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
was enacted.25 While explicitly regulating only the sale of goods, the
U.C.C. has had a strong influence on the common law of contracts.26
The U.C.C. adopted the doctrine of unconscionability in section
2.302, which reads as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid an unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that
the contract or any clause thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.27
While section 2-302 has not adopted a specific test, the official
comment provides for the following:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract. Subsection (2) makes it clear
that it is proper for the court to hear evidence upon
these questions. The principle is one of the prevention
of oppression and unfair surprise and not [the]
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.28
The trend of courts to use the U.C.C. as justification for the
applying doctrine of unconscionability, even in cases not explicitly

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (West 2001).
Id. at § 2-302.1.
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governed by the U.C.C., was bolstered by the adoption of section 208
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.29 The Restatement closely
follows the U.C.C., and reads as follows:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at
the time the contract is made a court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable term, or may
so limit the application of any unconscionable term as
to avoid any unconscionable result.30
While both the Restatement Second and the U.C.C. brought the
doctrine of unconscionability out of the court of equity and into the
court of law, they both frame the determination of conscionability as
a matter of law.31 Therefore, conscionability is determined solely by
the court.32 Of course, this is in keeping with the doctrine’s origins,
since in the court of equity there is no jury.33
While neither the Restatement Second nor the U.C.C. codified a
particular test, the comments accompanying both suggest a two-part
test that has become widely accepted.34 Under this test,
For relief to be granted on grounds of
unconscionability, the transaction must exhibit both
bargaining unfairness (referred to as procedural
unconscionability) and result [in] unfair or oppressive
terms (called substantive unconscionability) [in the
contract].35
While the test requires the showing of two distinct elements, in
practice courts have granted relief in some cases where only one of
the elements is shown.36 This, however, usually only happens when
that one element is so overwhelmingly present that the court can
assume the presence of the other element.37 Often when a court
grants relief upon the proof of just one element, that element is
“substantive unconscionability in the form of [an] outrageously unfair
contract.”38 Although in most cases courts will find “both improper

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Blum, supra n. 16, at § 13.11.2, 366.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1979).
Blum, supra n. 16, at § 13.11.2, 366.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 13.11.3, 367.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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bargaining and oppressive terms are present, at least to some
degree,”39 they are often less strict in requiring strong proof of a
second element if the first element is overwhelmingly shown.40
B.

Substantive Unconscionability Defined

The substantive unconscionability analysis focuses on the terms
of the contract at the time the contract was written.41 In determining
substantive unconscionability, a court uses its discretion to determine
whether in its opinion, the contract or the terms are harsh, unfair,
oppressive, or unduly favorable to one of the parties.42
C.

Procedural Unconscionability Defined

The procedural unconscionability analysis focuses on the
bargaining process that created the contract.43 In particular, this
element focuses on the bargaining behavior of the party alleged to
have acted unconscionably.44 The official comment to U.C.C. section
2-302 does not really provide much guidance on what is or is not
procedural unconscionability, and some courts have even concluded
that according to the comment a finding of substantive
unconscionability is all that is required under the U.C.C.45 The
comment merely states, “the principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise and not the disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power.”46
While there is no codification of what satisfies procedural
unconscionability in the Restatement either, the comment to section
208 largely echoes that of the U.C.C.47 The Restatement’s comment
does, however, expand on the U.C.C.’s comment by adding that gross
inequity of bargaining power may satisfy the requirements of
unconscionability if combined with substantively unfair terms.48 The
comment also indicates that gross inequity in bargaining power needs
to be combined with some indication that oppressive bargaining has

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at § 13.11.5, 369.
42. Id.; U.C.C. § 2-302.1
43. Blum, supra n. 16, at § 13.11.4, 369.
44. Id.
45. Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts vol. 8, §
18:10, 67 (4th ed., West 1998).
46. U.C.C. at § 2-302.1.
47. Id.; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208.
48. Id.
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occurred, such as some degree of deception or compulsion.49
While both comments emphasize that mere disparity in
bargaining power alone is not enough to constitute unconscionability,
the purpose of the doctrine is to place both parties on equal footing
by eliminating the incentive for the party with greater bargaining
strength to use that strength unfairly.50 “Thus the key is not whether
one party was more powerful or knowledgeable than the other but
whether it abused its power to impose its will on the other party.”51
The doctrine of procedural unconscionability has been extended
by courts beyond just the actual contract bargaining process and into
the marketplace.52 Courts are likely to find a contract unconscionable
if one party has so much control over the marketplace as to prevent
any real choice by the other party, and this control over the
marketplace has resulted in oppressive or unfair terms.53 This area of
contract law is directly intertwined with adhesion contracts.54
An adhesion contract is one where no bargaining has taken
place, and the superior party has simply presented a “take it or leave
it” contract or clause to the weaker party.55 While courts understand
the significance of these types of contracts in modern commerce,
courts will find them unconscionable when the terms of the contract
create an oppressive or unfair outcome.56
D. The Differences in the Level of Review Between Consumer and NonConsumer Cases

“Although some lawyers think of unconscionability as a form of
consumer protection, . . . courts have applied the doctrine much more
This
broadly, to a variety of commercial transactions.”57
misconception comes from a general unwillingness of courts to find
procedural unconscionability when both parties are commercial
entities.58 In these cases, courts review the contract under a more
deferential standard, requiring a much stronger showing of

49. Id.
50. Blum, supra n. 16, at § 13.11.4, 368.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Amy Hilsman Kastely, Deborah Waire Post, & Sharon Kang Hom, Contracting
Law 650 (Carolina Academic Press 1996).
58. See Klopp, Inc v. John Deere Co. 510 F. Supp. 807, 809-10 (E.D. Pa. 1981).

2002]

SMELLS LIKE SLAVERY

197

procedural unconscionabilty by the party challenging the contract.59
As the Klopp court notes, “[t]he rules developed in the consumer
case are necessarily tied to the identity of the contracting parties.”60
Consumer cases, according to the Klopp court, “involve
considerations absent from cases involving contracts between
commercial entities where the parties generally have sophisticated
business judgment and familiarity with contract terms gleaned
through repeated transactions.”61 The deference given to contracts
made by two commercial entities, however, does not entirely prevent
successful claims of unconscionability in the commercial setting.62 As
the Klopp court also notes, “a number of courts have recognized that
although it is possible, rarely will a commercial contract or term be
found to be unconscionable.”63 While courts are more reluctant to
find commercial contracts unconscionable, the definition of
unconscionability in commercial cases remains the same as the
definition in non-commercial cases.64 “Unconscionability may be
expressed as the lack of meaningful choice coupled with a contract
term which is so one-sided as to be oppressive.”65
E.

The Doctrine in Practice and the Effect of the Doctrine’s Discretionary
Nature

The vast discretion given to courts by the doctrine of
unconscionability is clearly illustrated in the Yellow Pages cases. In
these cases, where the facts are nearly identical, some courts have
determined that the clauses at issue were unconscionable while others
have decided that the clauses were not.66 The opposing logic laid
down in these cases demonstrates the extreme difficulty that a
plaintiff, especially a business plaintiff, faces when they challenge the
freedom to contract.
An example of a case where the court found an adhesion clause
unconscionable is Allen v. Michigan Bell Telephone Company.67 In
Allen, the plaintiff, an insurance agent, had contracted with Michigan

59. Id.
60. Id. at 810.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Robinson Insurance & Real Estate Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 366 F.
Supp. 307, 309-11 (W.D. Ark. 1973).
67. 18 Mich. App. 632, 640 (1969).
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Bell Telephone to publish several advertisements in the 1963 Yellow
Pages listings.68 After Michigan Bell failed to publish the listings,
Allen sued for damages.69 Michigan Bell responded by asserting the
following clause of their contract as an affirmative defense:
Telephone company (a) will not be bound by any
verbal agreements or (b) will not be liable to
advertiser for damages resulting from failure to
include all or any of said items of advertising in the
directories or from errors in the advertising printed in
the directories, in excess of the agreed prices for such
advertising for the issue in which the error or omission
occurs.70
After noting that courts in other jurisdictions had upheld
exculpatory clauses identical or similar to the one involved in this
case, the court concluded “that the factor of unequal bargaining
power between the parties had never been fairly considered in
connection with the standard limitation of liability clause in a Yellow
Pages advertisement contract.”71 In fact, as the court noted, only one
previous case had made any mention of the question of relative
bargaining positions, and even in that case the court failed to
“disclose what considerations or facts moved him to reject it out-ofhand.”72 After determining that the case turned on whether the
contract was unconscionable, the court focused its attention on the
bargaining power between the parties and the availability of other
alternatives to the Yellow Pages.73 As the court stated:
Implicit in the principle of freedom of contract is
the concept that at the time of contracting each party
has a realistic alternative to acceptance of the terms
offered. Where goods and services can only be
obtained from one source (or several sources on
noncompetitive terms) the choices of one who desires
to purchase are limited to acceptance of the terms
offered or doing without. Depending on the nature of
the goods or services and the purchaser’s needs, doing
without may or may not be a realistic alternative.
Where it is not, one who successfully exacts agreement
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 634.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 635 n. 1.
Id.
Id. at 636.
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to an unreasonable term cannot insist on the courts
enforcing it on the ground that it is “freely” entered
into, when it is not. He cannot in the name of freedom
of contract be heard to insist on enforcement of an
unreasonable contract term against one who on any
fair appraisal was not free to accept or reject that
term.74
The Allen court determined that the parties to the suit were not
in positions of equal bargaining power.75 After all, “the defendant’s
Yellow Pages is the only directory of classified telephone listings
freely distributed to all the telephone subscribers in the Flint area,”
and “[i]t is not disputed that the contract signed by the parties was a
form prepared by the defendant and used by the defendant in all
subscriptions for advertising in the [Y]ellow [P]ages.”76 The plaintiff
was also unable to bargain for different terms in the contract, since
the contract as presented and signed was strictly a “take it or leave it”
proposition.77 Finally, the court determined that there was no
reasonable alternative, because there were “no competing
director[ies] or means of communicating with the same audience of
potential customers except possibly at prohibitive (and by comparison
totally disproportionate) cost, doing without in this case was not a
realistic alternative.”78
After determining that the lack of a reasonable alternative
amounted to procedural unconscionability under these facts, the
court turned its attention to the determination of substantive
unconscionability.79 In determining that substantive unconscionability
existed, the court stated: “Clearly the challenged term is substantively
unreasonable. It relieves the defendant from all liability  its only
obligation is to return the agreed contract price for the service it did
not perform.”80
While adopted by some courts, others have rejected the logic in
81
Allen. The Robinson court departs from the logic laid forth in Allen
by claiming that Yellow Pages are in fact not monopolistic.82 The

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 637.
Id. at 638-40.
Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 640.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Robinson Insurance, 366 F. Supp. at 310.
Id. at 310-11.
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court in Robinson rested on the view that Yellow Pages are an
advertisement instead of an indispensable telephone directory for
businesses, and as such, there are other advertising alternatives.83
After determining that the contract was not procedurally
unconscionable, the court turned its attention to the substantive
element of the clause.84 The Robinson court ruled that the clause was
not substantively unreasonable because the “clause represents
nothing more than an application of a basic concept of contract law
which recognizes the propriety of parties contracting to limit their
liability.”85 While ruling that in the present case the clause was not
unconscionable, the court left open the question of whether the
clause would be unconscionable had the defendant been seeking
immunity from gross negligence or willful misconduct.86
Clearly these cases demonstrate the difficulty a plaintiff,
especially a commercial plaintiff, will face in persuading a court that a
contract
is
procedurally
unconscionable.
Substantive
unconscionability is much easier to prove, but without the procedural
element also being present most courts will refuse to find
unconscionability, unless in the court’s opinion the contract or clause
is outrageously unfair or oppressive.87

III
Analysis
A. The Level of Review to be Applied in Recording Industry Cases

While bands, and their members, may be reluctant to accept the
fact that they are a business, courts will almost certainly find they are
and view the contracts in that light.88 Generally, most bands split
profits among themselves rather than receive a salary from one or
more owners of the band.89 This format for sharing profits and
liabilities will automatically place the band in the legal position of
being a partnership.90 Bands that are just starting out, or just trying to
keep it simple, will also knowingly choose this route to organize their

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 311-12.
See supra n. 38.
See Stim, supra n. 5, at ch.1, 2.
Id. at ch. 1, 5.
Id. at ch. 1, 5-6.
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business because they don’t have to do anything to exist as a
partnership and a partnership treats all band members equally.91
The realization that a band is in fact a business and not just a
group of musicians having fun will not necessarily prevent the band
from challenging their recording contract as unconscionable.92 As the
Klopp court points out, the greater deference applied to contracts
between commercial entities does not necessarily prevent claims of
unconscionability.93 Furthermore, that greater deference might not be
warranted in all recording contracts. The Klopp court justifies this
greater deference on the premise that commercial entities are
generally more sophisticated than consumers, and have a “familiarity
with contract terms gleaned through repeated transactions.”94 This
logic would seem to suggest, however, that most recording contracts
between artists and independent labels falls outside of the
commercial context, and therefore the greater deference standard
should not be applied in those circumstances.
There is a strong argument that contracts between independent
labels and artists are more analogous to contracts between consumers
and commercial entities than to contracts between two commercial
entities. This is because independent label contracts are often
negotiated and signed without the presence of attorneys or the
financial ability to acquire legal advice on the part of the artist.95
While shorter, and with less “legalese” than a major label contract,
the independent label contract mirrors a major label contract and it is
filled with strict “take it or leave it” boilerplate language, like most
consumer contracts.96
The contract between a major label and an artist, however, will
most likely be examined under the greater deference standard. This
is because the major contract is signed with legal representation.97
While it is true that these contracts are essentially a “take it or leave
it” deal with little room for negotiation,98 the fact that the artist has
the legal advice to make an informed decision will most likely qualify
the contract for the greater deference standard of review.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
See Klopp, 510 F. Supp. at 810.
Id.
Id.
Stim, supra n. 5, at ch.14, 10; Senate Select Comm., supra n. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Procedural Unconscionability in Major Label Contracts Through the
Lack of a Reasonable Alternative

While it is true that major label contracts are negotiated with
both sides having legal counsel, this fact alone does not preclude a
finding of procedural unconscionability.99 As Allen demonstrates,
even in commercial contracts, the lack of a “realistic alternative” plus
a substantively unfair term may lead to a finding of
unconscionability.100 In today’s music industry, a band has no option
but to sign with a major label if the band wants to achieve any
commercial success, because independent labels are largely local in
nature and specialize in niche markets that prevent large commercial
success.101 An independent label is also hamstrung in today’s music
industry by a lack of the financial wherewithal to adequately promote
the albums and compete in the new pay-for-play system that major
labels have implemented with radio stations and MTV.102 These
business realities have allowed the five major labels to achieve control
over almost all commercially produced music.103
One of the most pronounced differences between major labels
and the independent labels is the ability to distribute the music.104
The independent labels are forced to distribute their catalogues
through independent distributors, while the major labels own and
operate their own distribution systems.105 This forces independent
labels to rely on independent record stores and some chainstores to
sell their records, while the major labels have access to all major
chains and retail outlets.106 This effectively closes off large portions of
rural America to independent labels because consumers in those
areas are forced (due to a lack of independent record stores) to rely
upon the local major chainstore, like Wal-Mart, for their music
purchases.107
An even greater disparity between the majors and independents
exists in the new pay-for-play system that determines what will be
played on the radio.108 While not illegal like the 1950’s and 1960’s

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Klopp, 510 F. Supp. at 810.
Allen, 18 Mich. App. at 637.
Senate Select Comm., supra n. 2.
Id.
Id.
Stim, supra n. 5, at ch.14, 2-3.
Id.
Id.
On file with author.
See Jason Bracelin, Foul Play for Airplay: Now More Than Ever, Payola Makes
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“payola” scandals, the outcome is the same.109 If an artist or label
wants to get its record played, it is going to have to pay.110 Donovan
Finn, head of radio promotion at the independent label Matador
Records, has stated: “to even see if you have a record that has a
chance of becoming a hit, you have to spend tens of thousands of
dollars in promotion money.”111 This puts the independents at an
insurmountable disadvantage because they lack the financial
wherewithal to compete in this system.112
In today’s legal pay-for-play situation, radio listeners are
supposed to be informed that the label has paid the station to air the
particular song.113 However, the way the payment is disclosed to
listeners is highly deceptive.114 This hurts the independents because
the public is given a false sense that the new music they hear on the
radio is the new hip music that fellow listeners request, instead of the
paid-for advertisement that it is.115
In January 1998, the major label Flip-Interscope Records paid
KUFO in Portland, Oregon about $5,000 to play a song by the then
emerging band Limp Bizkit.116 As a result of the deal, KUFO played
the song “Counterfeit” fifty times over five weeks.117 To inform
listeners that the time had been paid for, “just before each playing,
the station announced, ‘brought to you by Flip-Interscope’.”118 This is
deceptive because a listener has no real way of determining what the
“brought to you by” announcement means.119 After all, videos shown
on MTV clearly indicate the label’s name at the beginning and end of
each video.120 So how is a listener supposed to know that the
“brought to you by” means the radio station played it because the
the Radio World Go ‘Round, Cleveland Scene Music/Columns (Jan. 3, 2002).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Greg Knot, Arranged by Jeff McClucky; As an Independent Record Promoter, He
Makes Friends so He Can Make Hits, Chicago Trib. Magazine C10 (Nov. 28, 1999).
112. Id.
113. Neil Strauss, Pay-for-Play Back on the Air But This Rendition Is Legal, New York
Times A1 (March 31, 1998).
114. See Id.
115. See Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. MTV Music Videos (MTV Jan. 11, 2001) (cable tv broadcast); In the bottom right
corner of each video is the band name, the song title, the album, the label, and the video’s
director. This format is also followed by virtually all of the music video television
networks.
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station was paid to? In 1998, Chancellor Media, which operates more
than 400 stations, had twenty-five million dollars worth of pay-forplay contracts.121 Also in 1998, Chancellor established a $237,000
marketing partnership with the major label A&M Records.122 The
partnership included adds for a “Bryan Adams single and according
to a Los Angeles Times report, [it] resulted in ‘significantly increased
airplay’ for that record.”123
While some stations and labels play this straight and admit to a
pay-for-play situation, others have found ways to circumvent the
The Federal Communications
federal payola regulations.124
Commission (FCC) has not investigated any rumors of payola
recently, but Mr. Kelley at the FCC is quoted as saying:
Record labels and radio stations have found legal
ways to circumvent federal regulations and collaborate
to put songs on the air without telling listeners. For
example, a record label will pay for a radio-station
contest in which the winners are flown to meet a top
band if the station will play one of the label’s new,
lesser known bands.125
Another popular way to circumvent the system is to disguise the
payola as advertising dollars.126 One music executive, speaking on the
condition of anonymity, is quoted as saying, “[a] radio station will
hint, ‘Hey, take out ads on the record and we’ll see if we can get your
band added.’ It happens all the time. So you run fifteen to eighteen
spots and suddenly you’re added.”127
One of the most expensive ways to circumvent the system is
through forced radio station promotion concerts.128 Since the label
often helps to subsidize the tour, this has a direct impact on whether
the artist should sign with an independent or a major label.129 As Jeff
Kwatinetz, whose company manages Limp Bizkit, points out:
Bands often find themselves forced to play
121. David Hinckley, Pay-for-Play Gets Plug With Proper Disclosure, It’s Kosher, Says
Trade Mag, Daily News (New York) Television (July 7, 1999).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Strauss, supra n. 113.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See M. William Krasilovsky & Sidney Shemel, This Business of Music 16 (7th ed.,
Billboard Books 1995); Since a major has vastly greater financial resources to help
subsidize the tour, an artist would prefer to sign with a major in regards to this aspect.
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concerts sponsored by radio stations for little or no
money to either get added to a station’s playlist or to
keep from getting dropped from it. ‘I’ll be looking at a
Limp Bizkit tour and the itinerary will say Boston,
Hartford, New York, and I’ll get a call that says we
have to play this radio-station show on the West
Coast. So we have to cancel Boston, fly the band out
and at the end of the day it ends up costing $20,000 to
$25,000.130
Another way that major labels have an advantage is they have
the financial wherewithal to hire independent promoters like Jeff
McClusky.131 Independent promoters like McClusky lobby and
schmooze program directors to get a band’s music added to the
stations playlist.132 Given the limited amount of airtime radio stations
have, the services of promoters like McClusky are a sought after
commodity, and the labels pay them dearly.133 “A Virgin Records
source says the label paid McClusky $36,000 in one week alone to
land ‘adds’ at stations across the country for a new single by one of its
highest profile acts, Janet Jackson.”134 Deals like this “are a daily part
of business in an industry where major labels routinely spend
hundreds of thousands of dollars on radio promotion for each
record.”135 According to industry sources, “the five major labels
spend tens of millions of dollars annually on independent promoters
alone.”136
Another drastic difference between a major label and an
independent label is the ability of the major to afford the production
costs associated with music videos.137 Music videos today are a
significant, if not the preeminent, promotional aid.138 In 1993, MTV
reached 57 million households while its sister channel VH-1 reached
more than 47 million.139 According to Jem Aswad, product manager
for Caroline Records in New York, “[m]any independent labels,

130. Strauss, supra n. 113.
131. Greg Knot, supra n. 111.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Robert Woletz, Pop Music; A New Formula: Into the ‘Bin.’ Out Comes a Hit,
N.Y. Times § 2, 22 (Aug. 2, 1992).
138. Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 129, at 74
139. Id.
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ourselves included, do not have the clout, the connections and vast
sums of money that a Sony or a Warner Brothers has to throw into
promotion.”140 This drastic financial disparity leaves an independent
label artist out of the loop when it comes to one of the most
important streams for disseminating their music to the masses.141
Kevin Weatherly, program director of KROQ radio in Los Angeles,
admits, “Getting a record played on Buzz Bin142 will probably sell
more records than any radio station.”143
The importance of MTV airplay can be seen in sales of the selftitled tribute album by the band Temple of the Dog.144 The Seattlebased group, which included members of both Pearl Jam and
Soundgarden, recorded the album as a tribute to their late friend, upand-coming Seattle rocker Andy Wood.145 Released in April of 1991,
the record had sold only 105,000 copies in fourteen months, even
though it was the product of two of the most popular and influential
Seattle/grunge bands.146 Within three weeks of the band’s single
video, “Hunger Strike,” being added to MTV’s Buzz Bin, the album
sold an additional 315,000 copies.147
C.

Substantive Unconscionability in the Standard Industry Contract

While it is clear from the above discussion that procedural
unconscionability could be found based on the lack of a realistic
alternative, it must be kept in mind that courts, as seen in the Yellow
Pages cases, are reluctant to find procedural unconscionabilty in cases
between two commercial entities.148 Therefore, the real issue in any
case challenging the conscionability of the standard major label
recording contract is whether the recording label used its superior
bargaining power to force the artist into a contract, or a clause, that is
outrageously oppressive.
As the following discussion will
demonstrate, several of the standard terms in the major label
recording contract meet this outrageously oppressive standard.
1. Substantively Unconscionable Contract Clause 1: Royalties for Foreign
140.
141.
142.
weeks.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Woletz, supra n. 137.
Id.
A “Buzz Bin” video is typically shown three times a day for an average of eight
Id.
Id.
Pearl Jam, Timeline <http://www.pearljam.com> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003).
Woletz, supra n. 137.
Id.
See Robinson Insurance, 366 F. Supp. 307.
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Sale.

The use of the label’s superior bargaining power to force
outrageously unfair terms upon the artist is quite possibly no more
evident than in the clause dealing with royalties for foreign sales.
According to the industry standard contract, the label will not pay the
artist royalties on albums sold outside the United States (U.S.), if the
label receives payment for those sales in non-U.S. currency.149 Under
this clause, the label will pay royalties for those foreign sales (in the
foreign currency) only if the artist requests that the label do so in
writing, and the artist provides the label with a foreign bank account
to deposit the royalties in at the artist’s expense.150 The label will of
course calculate the currency difference so the payments will reflect
the royalties that would have been paid if those sales had been made
in U.S currency.151
One might think that this clause is drafted as a tax protection,
but that would be erroneous. American taxpayers are exempt from
foreign income tax on royalties earned abroad due to reciprocal
treaties with many countries.152 In those countries that do not have
reciprocal treaties with the United States, “some or all of the adverse
effects of that double taxation might be ameliorated by appropriate
use of the foreign tax credit.”153
This clause puts a significant burden on the artist. After all, does
a young artist really have the time or the knowledge required to set
up bank accounts in every single country that his major label sells his
album in? Of course, it might be argued that the artist should hire
counsel to do that task. The problem with this argument is that when
you add the additional cost of hiring counsel to the banking fees, the
costs begin to get prohibitive. And in any event, the label of course
tracks the sales and receives payment for those sales. So why should
the label benefit financially by not paying the royalties due its artists
on those sales? The additional cost to the label in paying these
foreign royalties would be minimal.
A clause limiting the label’s responsibility to paying foreign
royalties only when those payments exceed the difference in costs
between U.S royalties and the foreign royalties would be much fairer,
and probably conscionable. The labels, however, have failed to

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Television and Radio Artists, supra n. 6, at Clause 12.
Id.
Id.
Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra n. 129, at 402.
Id. at 402-03.
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include such a fair and conscionable royalties clause in the contracts.
The only logical conclusion that can be drawn here is that the labels
have used their superior bargaining power in an attempt to avoid
paying the royalties rightfully owed to the artist by putting onerous
and unconscionable requirements on the artist.
2. Substantively Unconscionable Contract Clause 2: Prohibition of Punitive
Damages, Costs, or Termination of Contract

The labels have even gone so far as to place language in the
contract which could possibly prevent a court from awarding punitive
damages or costs, or terminating the contract, in a successful suit over
royalty payments.154 The contract often reads as follows:
Your recovery of any such royalties will be the
sole remedy available to you or the artist by reason of
any claim related to Company’s royalty accountings.
Without limiting the generality of the preceding
sentence, neither you nor the Artist will have any right
to seek termination of this agreement or avoid the
performance of your obligations under it by reason of
any such claim.155
It appears from the language that the labels are not simply
limiting their liability for negligence; instead, it appears that the labels
are attempting to limit their liability for gross negligence as well,
something even the Robinson court would agree is unconscionable.156
3. Substantively Unconscionable Contract Clause 3: Auditing of Royalties

One of the most glaringly unfair and oppressive clauses in the
standard recording industry contract has to do with auditing of the
royalties paid out to the artist. The standard industry contract only
allows the artist to object to a royalty statement within one year of the
date the label should have rendered the statement.157 The contract
also makes no provisions for instances where the label has been late
in submitting the royalties statement to the artist.158 Therefore, if the
label is three hundred days late in submitting the royalties statement,
the artist only has sixty-five days to prepare for and audit the label.159
Furthermore, according to the standard contract, after the one-year
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
See 366 F. Supp. 307.
Television and Radio Artists, supra n. 6, at Clause 12.
Id.
Id.
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period has expired, the royalties paid to the artist are binding even if
they are inaccurate.160
Many labels further compound the unconscionability of this
clause, by requiring contractual terms that discourage audits
altogether.161 Using their superior bargaining power, labels present a
“take it or leave it” clause in the contract that requires the artist to
stipulate that no audit may be done on a contingency basis.162 This
clause puts a small time artist with little financial wherewithal in a
position where she is unable to audit the royalty payments because
she cannot afford the upfront fee required.163
Compounding on the unconscionability even further, the
contracts also restrict the accounting firms that artists can choose.164
According to the contract, the audit cannot be done by any firm or
accountant that is currently auditing the label for another artist.165
Even if the examination period is complete, the auditor cannot audit
the label for any other artist until all applicable audit issues have been
resolved in the first case.166 This allows the label to prevent an auditor
who is aware of how the label cooks its books from representing other
artists, by simply failing to resolve the issues brought up by that
auditor for another artist. Compounding the oppressiveness of this
clause is the fact that audit issues can take several years to be fully
resolved and during that entire time, according to the contract, that
auditor is unable to represent any other artists from that label.167
Since the late 1970’s, the recording industry has contractually
prohibited the auditing of crucial manufacturing and distribution
documents.168 As a result of this, an auditor’s task of determining
exactly how many CDs are sold, bartered for airplay, or discounted
through record clubs has become much tougher, if not impossible.169
Furthermore, another section of the contract requires that audits
take place no more than once a year and last less than thirty days, or

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Chuck Phillips, Auditors Put New Spin On Revolt Over Royalties,
<http://mv.latimes.com/templates/misc/printstory.jsp?slug=la%2D022602audit.story?coll=l
a%2Dhome%2Dtoday%2Dtimes> (accessed Feb. 26, 2002).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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the label can terminate the audit on seven days’ notice.170 The label
also requires that the audit take place at its offices, and at a time and
date that the label chooses.171
The outrageousness of the audit clauses are even further
compounded when you consider how some labels have acted when it
comes to paying the royalties they owe their artists. “Auditors at the
dozen firms that specialize in this field say some record labels
routinely fleece artists of millions in unpaid royalties.”172 According
to Sherman Oaks accountant Fred Wolinsky, “The companies play
While
this ‘catch-us-if-you-can’ game with artist royalties.”173
Wolinsky doesn’t say the labels intentionally scheme to take
advantage of artists, according to him, “the systems are designed to
impede,” and only “artists with muscle really have the ability to get
their money.”174 The labels achieve this by using antiquated auditing
procedures and understaffing their royalty departments.175
The accounting practices that created this situation are currently
undergoing both judicial and political scrutiny.176 In 2001, both Hole
and the Dixie Chicks filed lawsuits accusing their labels (Vivendi
Universal and Sony respectively) of engaging in “systematic thievery”
to “swindle” them and other acts out of millions of dollars in royalty
payments.177 The chairman of the California State Senate Select
Committee on the Entertainment Industry, Senator Kevin Murray,
plans on introducing a bill this year to penalize record labels that
purposely underpay royalties, by making it a crime punishable by a
$100,000 fine.178
4. Substantively Unconscionable Contract Clause 4: Copyright Ownership

One of the most oppressive and outrageous clauses in the
contract has to do with copyright ownership of the recorded material.
A standard boilerplate clause that applies to virtually every single
recording contract requires the artist to sign over their ownership of
the copyrighted material as a work-for-hire.179 The labels use their

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Television and Radio Artists, supra n. 6, at Clause 12.
Id.
Phillips, supra n. 167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Television and Radio Artists, supra n. 6, at Clause 1; Amicus Curiae Br. of
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superior bargaining power here to even defy the express
determination of Congress in the 1976 Copyright Act that sound
recordings are not works-for-hire.180
The importance of the work-for-hire provision can only be
understood when you examine its connection with the termination
provision of the 1976 Copyright Act. The Copyright Act allows artists
to recapture their copyrights thirty-five years after contractual
assignment, by termination of the assignment.181 Congress intended
the right of termination to be a safeguard for new artists who assign
their copyrights at a time when they have limited bargaining power
and they cannot know the future value of their copyrights.182
Congress was so adamant in this protection, that it expressly forbid
the contracting away of the termination provision in the Act.183
This right of termination, however, does not apply to works that
are works-for-hire,184 because if a work is made as a work-for-hire the
party that commissioned the work becomes the sole owner and
author of the copyright.185 This distinction in the right of termination,
however, does not allow the record labels to legally bypass the right
of termination by contractually claiming the works are works-for-hire.
As Nimmer on Copyrights proclaims, the termination clause may not
be contracted away by simply claiming that a work is a work-for-hire
when that work fails to fall into one or more of the enumerated workfor-hire categories.186 Avoiding the termination right in such a
manner “would be contrary to the statutory provision that
termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary.”187
Under the Copyright Act, for a work to be considered a workfor-hire it must fall within one or more of nine specifically

Recording Artist Coalition, Recording Industry Association of America v. Napster, Inc.,
No. C-MDL-00-1369 MHP (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2001).
180. Infra nn. 187-90; Amicus Curiae Br. of Recording Artist Coalition, Recording
Industry Association of America v. Napster, Inc., No. C-MDL-00-1369 MHP.
181. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994); Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright vol. 3, § 11.01[B], 11-6 (Lexis 1999).
182. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 181, at § 11.01[A], 11-3; Amicus Curiae Br. of
Recording Artist Coalition, Recording Industry Association of America v. Napster, Inc.,
No. C-MDL-00-1369 MHP.
183. 17 U.S.C. at § 203(a)(5); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra 181, at § 11.02[A][2], 11-11.
184. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra 181, at § 11.02[A][2], 11-11.
185. Id. at Vol. 1, § 5.03[A], 5-11.
186. Id. at Vol. 3, § 11.02[A][2], 11-11.
187. Id.
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enumerated classifications.188 Those classifications are:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specifically ordered or commissioned
for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation,
as an instructional text, as answer material for test, or
as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of
the foregoing sentence, a supplementary work is a
work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct
to a work by another author for the purpose of
introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining,
revising, commenting upon or assisting in the use of
the works such as forewords, afterwards, pictorial
illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes,
musical arrangements, answer material for tests,
bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an
‘instructional text’ is a literary, pictorial, or graphic
work prepared for publication with the purpose of use
189
in systematic instructional activities.
In coming to this definition Congress consulted with various
interested parties before it reached the above language:
The status of works prepared on special order or
commission was a major issue in the development of
the definition of ‘works made for hire’ in section 101,
which has undergone extensive revision during the
legislative process. The basic problem is how to draw
a statutory line between those works written on special
order or commission that should be considered as
‘works made for hire,’ and those that should not. The
definition now provided by the bill represents a
compromise, which in effect spells out those specific
categories of commissioned works that can be
considered ‘works made for hire’ under certain
190
circumstances.

188. Id.; Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Ried, 490 U.S. 730, 748 (1989).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
th
190. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, 94 Cong., 2d session (1976)
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As the above legislative history clearly illustrates, the
classifications are meant to be all-inclusive, and sound recordings are
therefore exempted from classification as works-for-hire.
While the judicial record on the question of whether sound
recordings qualify as works-for-hire is very limited, the three courts
that have considered the question all concluded that they do not.191
The Staggers court ruled that “[b]ecause a sound recording does not
fit within any of the nine categories of ‘specially ordered or
commissioned’ works, whether it [is] made for hire depends” on the
employment relationship between the label and the artist under the
common law of agency.192 Under this ruling, sound recordings will
never be considered works-for-hire, because the employment
relationship between the artist and the label is more akin to an
independent
contractor
relationship
than
a
standard
employee/employer relationship required by the common law of
agency.193
Compounding the unconscionability of this particular clause is
the fact that the artist receives no fee or payment for making an
album and therefore does not qualify as an employee of the label.194
The artist receives an advance to cover the costs of the recording
process, but under the recoupment clause of the contract, the artist
pays back the advance in full through their royalties.195 The
recoupment clause of the contract even goes so far as to require the
artist pay for the promotion and packaging of the albums.196 It’s
because of this recoupment clause that the majority of recording
artists will never achieve financial success or independence.197 The
recoupment clause and the work-for-hire clause have left artists in a
position where they have paid for everything but own nothing.198

191. Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 1999); Ballas v.
Gennara Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 1999); Lulirama Ltd v. Axcess Broadcast
Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 872 (5th Cir. 1997). The judicial record is limited because the vast
number of cases will not become ripe for adjudication until the year 2013, when the artists
can begin to try and recapture their works under the termination right.
192. Staggers, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
193. Ryan Ashley Rafoth, Limitations of the 1999 Work-For-Hire Amendment: Courts
Should Not Consider Sound Recordings to Be Works-For-Hire When Artists’ Termination
Rights Begin Vesting in Year 2013, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1031-1040 (2000).
194. Amicus Curiae Br. of Recording Artist Coalition, Recording Industry Association
of America v. Napster, Inc., No. C-MDL-00-1369 MHP.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Recording Artists Coalition, Contractual Issues, supra n. 1.
198. Id.
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In achieving the inclusion of this clause in the contract, the label
has also divested the artist of any say in how the music is used in the
future.199 Therefore, if the label wishes, and at its sole discretion, it
can authorize the music to be used for soundtracks, advertising, or
sampling by other artists.200 An outrageous example of this is seen in
the sampling, unauthorized by the artist, of the groundbreaking
Nirvana song “Smells Like Teen Spirit” by a German band on a
single featuring a neo-nazi skinhead holding a shotgun on the cover.201
The author of the song, Kurt Cobain, had been tormented as a child
by hate filled people, and his music was an outgrowth of his angst
from that experience.202 In fact the song “Smells Like Teen Spirit” is
an ironic statement against macho hate filled actions.203 Given Kurt
Cobain’s life experience and the actual meaning of the song in
question, it is clear that he would not have authorized his music to be
sampled by a band that placed a neo-nazi skinhead on its cover. The
label, however, allowed the music to be sampled, and in the words of
Cobain’s widow, this action has “debased and devalued one of the
most influential rock recordings in music history.”204
Realizing they would have difficulty justifying a claim that sound
recordings were works-for-hire, the Recording Industry Association
of America (the labels’ trade group and lobbying arm) pushed for an
amendment to the Copyright Act, which would include sound
recordings in the categories of works eligible for classification as a
work-for-hire.205 Billboard magazine reported that the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) tried unsuccessfully for
years to get the language changed, by trying to attach the amendment
to various copyright bills.206 In 1999, the RIAA finally succeeded in
getting the Copyright Act amended to include sound recordings in the

199. Television and Radio Artists, supra n. 6, at Clause 1.
200. Id.
201. See MTV, Courtney Love Sues For Control Of Nirvana’s Master Recordings
<http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1449505/20011002/story.jhtml> (Oct. 2, 2001); While
the article claims the sample was unauthorized, the label under the contract does not need
Love’s authorization. Universal is the label for both bands so the authorization is implicit.
It should also be noted that the man on the cover had a swastika tattoo, thus indicating he
is a neo-nazi skinhead.
202. Cobain: From the Editors of Rolling Stone 35-50 (Rolling Stone 1997).
203. See Id.; Supra n. 199.
204. Supra n. 199.
205. See Amicus Curiae Br. of Recording Artist Coalition, Recording Industry
Association of America v. Napster, Inc., No. C-MDL-00-1369 MHP.
206. Bill Holland, Acts’ Reps Decry C’right Clause, Billboard, 75 (Jan. 15, 2000).
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“works made for hire” provision.207
Aside from the substantive impact of the amendment on artists,
the amendment was controversial because of the way it was passed.
A very credible argument could be made that the RIAA acted like
thieves in the night when they got the amendment passed. “Register
of Copyrights Marybeth Peters says she was concerned ‘that [the
amendment] was suggested in the middle of the night,. . .obviously
this was done without any input from performers.”208 As an appendix
to an appropriations bill of over one thousand pages, the new workfor-hire amendment passed without hearings or debate on the last day
Congress was in session.209 “The amendment is one sentence found
within the appendix in a title regarding satellite transmissions of
copyrighted television content.”210 Billboard reported that the
amendment “was not requested by any member of Congress. Instead,
it was apparently inserted into a final conference report of the
Satellite bill by a congressional staffer at the request of the RIAA.”211
Adding to the appearance of impropriety, Billboard reports that the
staffer, Martin Glazier, was hired by the RIAA as its new Washington
lobbyist just months after the bill’s passage.212
Hilary Rosen, president and CEO of the RIAA, claims that the
amendment was merely a technical amendment and that it was not a
preemptive strike against litigation on the works-for-hire issue.213 She
further asserts that “record companies have long registered [sound]
recordings with the Copyright Office as works-for-hire, ‘this is why in
everybody’s view this was a technical issue’.”214 Rosen’s idea of
“everybody,” however, must not include the artists, their attorneys,
Intellectual Property professors and authors, top officials at the
Copyright Office, or the courts for that matter, because all believe
differently.215 When asked if the amendment was technical in nature,
Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters responded, “the answer is
no. It is a substantive amendment.”216 M. William Krasilovsky, a
veteran music business attorney and the co-author of the music
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industry text, This Business Of Music, says the assertion that the
amendment was a clarification is fraudulent.217
After the amendment became public knowledge, recording
artists immediately mobilized in a successful fight to get it repealed.218
Even after the repeal of the amendment, the labels still don’t seem
inclined to change their ways and they use their overwhelming
bargaining power to force artists into signing contracts that classify
their recordings as works made for hire.219 The labels, even when
faced with the very real possibility they were about to lose the
amendment, failed to show a willingness to negotiate an acceptable
work-for-hire amendment with the artists.220 The labels took this
approach even after Congress expressed a clear desire that the labels
and recording artists negotiate an acceptable work-for-hire
amendment.221 The obvious conclusion from this episode is that the
recording industry has made a tactical decision to use its superior
strength to fight the issue out in court.222 This tactical decision
prevents many artists from ever recouping their work, because they
will lack the financial wherewithal to challenge the labels’ practices in
court. As a result, labels will be able to continue exploiting the
intellectual property of many artists well beyond the time frame
prescribed by Congress.
5. Substantively Unconscionable Contract Clause 5: Term of Contract

Another industry standard clause that is unconscionable is the
term of the contracts. This particular clause is currently under review
by the California legislature.223 Under the standard contract, the term
is not calculated in years but rather in the number of albums.224 The
number of albums differs from artist to artist, but the label will
usually require five to seven albums during the term of the contract.225
The number of albums, however, could be far fewer if the label
217. Id.
218. Amicus Curiae Br. of Recording Artist Coalition, Recording Industry Association
of America v. Napster, Inc., No. C-MDL-00-1369 MHP.
219. Id.
220. Recording Artists Coalition, Work for Hire, available at
<http://www.artistsagainstpiracy.com/workforhire.html> (accessed Sept. 25, 2001).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. California State Senate Judiciary Committee, “SB 1246 Murray. Recording Artists
Contracts: Legal Issues” (Calgov Mar. 19, 2002) (tv broadcast) [hereinafter Senate
Judiciary Comm.].
224. Id.
225. Id.
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decides not to exercise its options on the remaining albums.226 This
decision is at the sole discretion of the label, and the label is under no
duty to pay the artist anything for terminating the remainder of the
contract.227 While the use of the options clause by the label to get out
of the contract may not be unconscionable, the label’s use of this
clause to extend the contracts into decades instead of years is most
certainly unconscionable.228
Under California law, no personal service contract may extend
beyond seven years.229 This law has become known as the de
Havilland law, because many see it as the codification of the ruling
handed down by California courts in Olivia de Havilland’s suit against
the Warner Bros. Studios.230 The 1940’s de Havilland suit “helped
break the back of the studio star system.”231 Under the studio star
system, a studio paid relatively low wages to the talent it had
developed and signed to exclusive long-term personal service
contracts.232
In 1987, the labels pushed for, and were granted, the addition of
a subsection to the seven-year statute.233 There are claims, however,
that the subsection was added without proper debate and that the
labels duped the California legislature into passing the subsection.234
In either case, the labels have used the subsection to force artists into
staying with a label under the same contract well in excess of the
seven-year period.235 An outrageous example of this can be seen in
the contract of country singer LeAnn Rimes. The contract, which
prohibits her from residing in all but two states, was signed when
Rimes was only 13.236 The contract includes label options on twentyone albums, which means Rimes will be at least 35 before the
completion of the contract.237
Under the additional subsection of the seven-year statute, labels
are allowed to sue an artist for failing to deliver the number of albums
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called for in the contract.238 This subsection extends the contract
beyond the seven-year period, because the labels refuse to accept
more than one album every eighteen to twenty-four months.239 While
this may not have been the industry reality in the 1970’s, when Elton
John released seven multi-platinum albums in seven years,240 today
labels claim they need this time to promote the albums and to allow
artists to tour in support of the album.241 The question, then, is: “Do
the labels really need this claimed promotional time period, or are
they simply using this as an excuse to bypass the term limit of the
seven-year statute?” In either case, this subsection, and the manner
in which the labels bypass the seven-year rule has yet to be
adjudicated “because, to prevent a decision in favor of an artist,
record companies invariably settle these suits.”242
Don Henley, after being under contract for more than seven
years, tried to provide his label with the master recordings to finish
out his contract.243 The label refused to accept the albums, because
they were not delivered over what the label felt was an appropriate
time period.244 As a result, Henley made it known that he would no
longer record for Geffen Records, and the label filed a damages suit
under the subsection of the seven-year statute.245 Henley then filed a
counter suit against the label, claiming that the contract was now void
because the seven years had passed and that the majors had conspired
to force him into staying with his previous contract.246 The label
countered by claiming that the seven years was not up, because
Henley and the label had renegotiated the contract, and at that point
the seven years began to run again.247 Henley’s former bandmate in
the Eagles, Glenn Frey, also used the seven-year statute in an attempt
to get out of his deal with MCA.248 His attempt was also met with a

238. Id.
239. See Id. There are a few exceptions to this rule, like Garth Brooks, who released
an album a year for a time. Other artists, like Prince and Don Henley, have had albums
rejected because they were not delivered over what the label felt was an appropriate time
period.
240. Behind the Music, “Elton John” (VH1 Jan. 30, 2002) (tv series).
241. Senate Select Comm., supra n. 2.
242. Soocher, supra n. 2, at 55.
243. Senate Select Comm., supra n. 2.
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lawsuit by the label.249 Both cases were settled before they proceeded
to trail,250 and therefore the question of how the seven-year statute is
to be interpreted was not resolved.
While Courtney Love was involved in a lawsuit that seemed
destined for trial over this very provision with her label,251 an
eleventh-hour settlement granted her the release from the contract
she sought,252 and the issue of how to calculate the seven years is still
unclear. There is clearly a need for judicial interpretation of this
statute; however, that interpretation may never come, due to new
maneuvers in the California Legislature. California State Senator
Kevin Murray has written a bill that would repeal the subsection of
the seven-year statute.253 The new bill would also expressly prevent
the parties from contracting out of the statute.254
6. Substantively Unconscionable Conduct 1: Denial of a Key-Man Provision.

Another outrageous and oppressive part of the contract has to do
with a clause that an artist would want, but the label is almost always
unwilling to agree to.255 A “Key-Man” clause allows the artist to leave
the label if certain key personnel, like the label head, leave the
label.256 This is an important clause for bands because all major label
contracts, and increasingly independent label contracts, are filled with
the same “take it or leave it” oppressive boilerplate language.257
Therefore, artists often determine which label to sign with based
upon their personal relationships with the people that sign them to
the label.258 Without this clause, artists are stuck with the label after
the people that were instrumental in the band’s decision to sign have
either been fired or moved on.259

249. Id.
250. Id. at 55-56.
251. Senate Select Comm., supra n. 2; Senate Judiciary Comm., supra n. 223.
252. Phil Hardy, Practices of US record companies come under scrutiny as the industry
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7. Substantively Unconscionable Conduct 2: Conduct in the Event the Label
Undergoes a Merger, Acquisition, or Dissolution.

A similar and even more difficult provision for artists to get in
the contract has to do with what happens if the label is merged, sold,
or dissolved.260 Since an artist will try to sign with a label that
specializes in the genre of music they perform, this can be a very
important clause to secure.261 This very clause was one of the key
issues in two lawsuits filed by Courtney Love.262 While neither
Nirvana nor Love’s band Hole was able to get this provision added to
the contracts they signed with Geffen Records, Love is arguing that
the contracts became void as a matter of law after Universal’s
purchase of Geffen.263 The suits were both settled just before trial,
with settlements that clearly favored Ms. Love.264 In the case of Hole,
the band chose to turn down a contract with Universal, and signed
with Geffen because the band felt Geffen was a better fit for their
music.265 Geffen, at the time, had many of the hit “grunge” genre
bands under contract, including Nirvana.266 As a result of this, Hole
decided that Geffen would be the best fit for their music.267 After
signing their contract however, Hole was in for quite an unpleasant
shock when Geffen was bought out by the label the band had jilted
just months before.268 Compounding the unwarranted label change
was Universal’s assignment of the contract to its Interscope
subsidiary.269 At that point, Interscope had no commitment to rock
music and no experience in that genre of music.270 This left Nirvana
and Hole in a situation where the label’s promotion machine was
learning on the job.271 Clearly, this fundamentally changed the
contract that was originally signed between Geffen and Hole. While
Love was able to use her financial wherewithal to extract herself from
the contracts, artists without the financial muscle to sue will be, and
have been, stuck with their contracts in similar situations.
260. Id.
261. Senate Select Comm., supra n. 2.
262. MTV, supra n. 199.
263. Id.; Love as the lead member of Hole filed the Hole suit in her own name. She
has filed the Nirvana suit in the name of her late husband’s estate.
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D. The Inability of Courts to Deal with the Recording Industry Contract

As the above discussion has indicated, a court could and should
find the standard industry contract unconscionable. After all,
procedural unconscionability exists because there is no meaningful
negotiation process combined with the lack of a realistic alternative.
The substantive prong is met by the inclusion of several standard
contract clauses which are oppressive and unduly favorable to the
labels. However, there are serious disadvantages in allowing the
judiciary to address the problems seen in the standard recording
industry contract with the doctrine of unconscionability. Those
disadvantages include the artist’s typical inability to finance a suit, the
harm caused by the extended period of inactivity during the suit, and
the uncertainty created by the discretionary nature of the doctrine.
It’s these disadvantages that have allowed the recording industry to
develop into the oppressive industry it is. As Orrin Hatch put it, “this
is the only industry in which after you pay off the mortgage the bank
272
still owns the house.”
1. Problem 1: Lack of Financial Resources to Litigate Issue

The first hurdle artists have to overcome in challenging their
contract in court is the very same hurdle that forced them to sign with
the major label to begin with: a lack of financial wherewithal. The
major labels are huge multinational conglomerates today, and they
have the financial resources to withstand even the most lengthy
contract disputes. The average artist, on the other hand, will not have
the financial ability to withstand the endless appeals and legal fees.
The few artists who do have the resources to put up a fight are often
rewarded with new, and much fairer, contracts when they merely
threaten suit.273 The labels have claimed they award these artists with
the new contracts in order to maintain a good relationship with their
high profile artists,274 but this seems somewhat dubious, because even
when the contracts are renegotiated many of the substantively
unconscionable clauses remain in the new contract.275
One might claim that if artists with the ability to sue do not take
advantage of the doctrine of unconscionability, then the contracts
must not be that unfair. This logic, however, fails to acknowledge two
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very important realities. First, as discussed earlier, all the major
labels use a substantially unfair contract and even those artists with
the financial resources to survive the costs of a lawsuit renegotiate
rather than sue.276 And secondly, the harm a long drawn-out hiatus
can have on an artist’s career forces the artist into accepting a
renegotiated contract, which still leaves many of the most oppressive
terms intact.277
2. Problem 2: Length of Time Required for Judicial Intervention

The judicial process is notoriously long, and is made even longer
by the appeals process.
The potential magnitude of an
unconscionability ruling on the music industry as a whole makes
endless appeals a foregone conclusion.278 In all, it could take in the
neighborhood of three to seven years for any suit to be fully
adjudicated. While this might not seem like an eternity, when you
consider the average length of a recording artist career, this can be
even longer than an eternity.279
The detrimental effect this extended period of inactivity can have
on an artist’s career can be seen in the following example. In 1992,
George Michael filed suit in England against his label, Sony Music.280
The suit involved the English legal principle of restraint of trade.281
Other labels, afraid of the possible ramifications if the court found for
Michael, watched the proceedings intently.282 The trial started in
1994, and lasted for seventy-five days.283 The Court took another
sixty-one days to issue a ruling in favor of Sony.284 The court reasoned
that Michael had affirmed the contract when he asked for an
advancement on his 1992 album, even after he had been advised of
his potential ability to break the contract on restraint of trade
grounds.285
This, however, was not the end of the saga. After the ruling
Michael filed for and was granted an appeal hearing, albeit not on the
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expedited basis he had requested.286 Sony, facing the reality that their
victory might be lost on appeal, decided to settle.287 In July 1995, a
settlement was finalized that allowed Michael to leave Sony Music
and sign with Dreamworks-Virgin.288 According to the settlement,
Sony was allowed to release Michael’s greatest hits album, and the
new contract between Dreamworks-Virgin and Michael was free of
many of the oppressive terms that are standard in recording industry
contracts.289
While appearing to be a victory, the outcome for Michael can
also be considered a defeat. When Michael filed suit, he was at or
near the pinnacle of his career. By the time the six-year ordeal was
over, however, Michael had largely been forgotten by his fans.290 His
first new album after the ordeal achieved only lukewarm sales, even
though it followed two hugely successful multi-platinum albums.291 It
became very clear from the sales that Michael’s six-year hiatus had
certainly affected his career momentum.292
The outcome of this ordeal had a serious psychological effect on
the industry as a whole.293 Labels learned that they had “better be
careful about how [they] throw [their] weight around.”294 While
artists learned that it might be possible to void their contracts through
lawsuits, they also learned how costly the suits could be, both
financially and to their careers.295
3. Problem 3: Judicial Inconsistency Inherent to the Doctrine of
Unconscionability

Another important disadvantage in allowing the judiciary to
handle the problem created by these contracts has to do with the
doctrine itself. The doctrine of unconscionability is, by its very
nature, discretionary.296 It is this discretion that makes the doctrine
inappropriate for handling an industry-wide problem. As seen in the
Yellow Pages cases, the very same clause can be found by one
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jurisdiction to be unconscionable, while another merely finds the
clause to be a standard and appropriate business practice.297
Compounding this problem is the overwhelming pressure on the
judiciary in reaching a ruling on these issues. Because the most
oppressive and, therefore, unconscionable terms in the contract are
ones that are standard in almost all recording industry contracts
(independents and majors alike), a finding of unconscionability by a
court will throw the whole industry into chaos. Labels and artists
alike will have to reexamine their contracts; and since a court may
only strike the clause or the contract as a whole, neither the artists
nor the labels will have any firm understanding of what a court would
consider conscionable. A court, well aware that a finding of
unconscionability will put a multi-billion dollar industry into chaos,
might not be willing to find unconscionability, and instead defer to
the legislature to handle the problem.

IV
Proposal
Since the judiciary is unable to deal with the outrageously unfair
aspects of the standard recording industry contract, I propose that
Congress step in for the good of the artists, the labels, and the fans.
There are several options open to Congress, ranging from outright
regulation of the entire contract, to the lesser, and probably more
appropriate, regulation of specific clauses. In either event, the
outright revolt that is occurring in the industry today requires that
Congress step in and step in fast.
When it examines the legislative options open to it, the first thing
that Congress needs to realize is that the labels have an
overwhelmingly superior bargaining position. Congress needs to
address this problem by expressly preventing the parties from
contracting out of any legislation that Congress passes on these issues.
This would not be an unusual step in cases like this, and Congress
need look no further than the termination clause in the Copyright Act
to justify the decision. The termination clause expressly prevents
parties from contracting out of the clause in order to protect
copyright authors, who most likely would be at a disadvantage in the
298
Critics of this approach will claim that it
bargaining process.
destroys the parties’ freedom of contract. The freedom to contract,
however, is not absolute, and the legislature will simply be making a
297. See supra n. 66.
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legislative determination on what is unconscionable.
A. Areas in the Contract that need Specific Federal Legislative Revision
1. Specific Revision 1: Address Works-for-Hire Provision

One of the most glaringly unfair aspects of the contract that
Congress needs to address is the works-for-hire provision. While the
Copyright Act appears to be very clear on this issue, and Intellectual
Property professors agree that the sound recordings are not worksfor-hire,299 the standard industry contract requires that the artist sign
over their authorship rights as works-for-hire. Congress, in order to
illuminate this aspect of the contract, needs to develop a listing of
works that are specifically not eligible for treatment as works-for-hire,
in addition to the current system, which lists works that could qualify
as works-for-hire. In repealing the 1999 amendment,300 Congress did
nothing more than reestablish the previous status quo: a status quo in
which the labels are able to use their superior bargaining power to
force the artists into signing over their authorship rights. This change
will have no effect on the labels for thirty-five years from the delivery
date of the album, but it will allow artists to recover the product of
their labor (a product which under the recoupment clause they have
paid for) even if they do not have the resources to sue. As was
originally intended by the right of termination, this would allow the
artist to recapture their rights in the works they authored, and it
would allow them to pass on works to their children and
grandchildren. The labels will argue that they need the authorship
rights to the works in order to make a profit and recover the money
they spent in promoting the albums. This argument, however, fails to
recognize the reality that only a very few albums will have any value
thirty-five years after their release. It is illogical to believe that a
label, which has been unable to make a profit on an album in thirtyfive years, will ever be able to make a profit off that album after the
expiration of that time period. And furthermore, in those cases
where the album still has commercial value thirty-five years into the
future, the label will have the inside track on renegotiating the rights
to the music.

299. Amicus Curiae Br. of Recording Artist Coalition, Recording Industry Association
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2. Specific Revision 2: Royalty Payments

Another important aspect of the contract that should be
addressed with legislation is royalty payments. The ability of a label
to avoid paying royalties on albums sold in non-U.S. currency makes
no sense. Clearly, the labels can calculate currency exchange rates.
The solution to this issue is simply that Congress needs to require
royalty payments on all sales, regardless of where those sales take
place. Furthermore, Congress needs to require that the label make
those payments to one bank account in whatever currency and
country the artist chooses. Currently, the labels will only pay
royalties on albums sold outside the U.S. if the band provides a
foreign bank account. There should be no problem with the label
calculating the rate and depositing the payments in one bank rather
than several, especially in today’s world of instant money transfers.
While the issue of who should bear the burden of currency exchange
rate risk will arise, this issue can be fairly dealt with in the new
regulation by requiring calculation of the royalty payments once a
month, using specific exchange agencies.
3. Specific Revision 3: Limit the Term of the Contract

Congress also needs to federally legislate a term limit to these
contracts. The California seven-year statute, while a step in the right
direction, has been circumvented by the added subsection. California
State Senator Murray has addressed the problem by writing a bill that
would repeal the subsection. The problem with this solution is that
new bill will only affect those deals made in California.301 Therefore,
artists who sign their deals in other states, like Tennessee (many
country music acts sign their deals in Nashville), are unable to take
advantage of the statute.
Another problem with the California statute is that the sevenyear maximum length is too long. With an artist delivering albums at
the normal industry rate of one every eighteen to twenty-four
months, the contract will last for four albums.302 Since the average
artist’s career probably will not last for four albums, this prevents the
artist from ever having the chance to try and test their value in the
open label market. A more appropriate time limit would be closer to
five years. This would allow for the delivery of at least three albums
to the label.
Another option Congress should consider is doing away with
301. Senate Judiciary Comm., supra n. 223.
302. Id.
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term limits in years, and instead defining the limit in terms of actual
albums delivered. This would allow the label to be secure in the
delivery of the albums contracted for, even in those situations where
the artist has other career pursuits that might prevent the delivery of
albums in the standard industry time frame. After all, it appears that
big name recording artists are frequently pursuing acting careers,
which has often slowed their delivery of albums.303
Both major and independent labels argued against the seven year
statute because they claim they need the longer term contracts in
order to recoup the money they have spent in developing the artist
and promoting previous albums.304 This argument is flawed, because
it fails to recognize the reality that the earlier material of an artist
who achieves large commercial success will also become sought after.
An example of this is Nirvana’s first album bleach. The album was
released on the independent label SubPop.305 After Nirvana achieved
large commercial success with their second album Nevermind (a
major label release), bleach became one of SubPop’s best sellers, and
it still is.306 The success of Nirvana also brought the label worldwide
fame and increased the sales and exposure of the label’s entire
catalogue of artists.307 Clearly, SubPop and the entire Seattle music
scene commercially benefited from Nirvana’s big label contract,
which enabled the band to make the groundbreaking “Smells Like
Teen Spirit” video.308
4. Specific Revision 4: Auditing Provisions

One of the most important aspects of the standard contract that
Congress needs to address is the audit provisions. As the system now
stands, the artist is unable to hire auditors that are currently auditing
the label for another artist.309 While it might be true that conflicts of
interest could develop between the auditor and his two separate
clients, the decision to avoid these possible conflicts should be left up
to the artist, not the label. After all, it is the artist, not the label that
stands to lose if a conflict arises. The labels might counter that they
are trying to preempt a suit where they are accused of colluding with
the auditor to benefit one client while damaging another. The
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underlying principle of the suit, however, would be that the label has
failed to pay the appropriate amount of royalties. If the label had
indeed paid the royalties owed the artist, then there would be no
grounds for a suit because there could be no collusion. If Congress
were to statutorily ban this provision, the label would still have the
superior position in disputes over royalties. The artist’s position,
however, would be substantially improved, because the artist would
then have the option of hiring auditors that were intimately familiar
with that labels accounting practices.
Another audit provision that Congress needs to address is the
label’s limitations on the documents that can be examined and the
time and place for those examinations. There is no logical reason to
exclude the auditor from examining copies of the materials in his own
office. The standard recording contract, however, requires that the
observations take place in the label’s offices, and the labels have even
gone so far as to limit the artist’s ability to examine important
manufacturing documents that are needed for the audit.310 Congress
needs to require the labels to open their books fully, so that audits
can be properly done and the artist can be assured she has received
the royalties she deserves.
The labels might claim that they need these provisions to protect
themselves from artists who would use the ability to audit as an
oppressive tool to get out of their contracts. This logic is faulty,
though, because it fails to recognize the remedies that courts could
provide.311 If an artist is using the audit as an oppressive bargaining
tool, the label could simply seek an injunction and sanctions from the
courts to stop the oppressive behavior.

V
Conclusion
The recording industry has used its superior bargaining position
to force artists into signing contracts that amount to professional
slavery. The courts have been unable to address this issue because
the labels will settle when faced with an artist who has the muscle to
sue the label successfully. The artists will accept a settlement that
leaves many, if not all, of the oppressive terms in the contracts,
because of the damage a drawn-out lawsuit will do to their careers
and pocketbooks. Allowing courts to handle the issue is also
problematic because the doctrine of unconscionability is discretionary
310. See supra nn. 168-171.
311. Senate Select Comm., supra n. 2.
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and a discretionary doctrine is inappropriate in dealing with an
industry-wide issue such as this one. Therefore, Congress needs to
step in and legislate solutions to some of the more oppressive clauses
in the contract for the benefit of the artist, the labels, and the fans.
My proposals would benefit the artists, the labels, and the fans,
because they would ban many of the outrageously oppressive terms in
the contracts that have created the open revolt now occurring in the
recording industry. This hostility has damaged fans, artists, and labels
because the disputes between the labels and the artists have led to
several multi-platinum artists refusing to record music for their labels.
An example of this is the Nevermind ten-year anniversary box
set, which was set to be released in the fall of 2001. The box set was
going to include unreleased music that had been recorded just before
the death of Kurt Cobain. The box set was never released, though,
because of the lawsuit over Nirvana’s contract. While a settlement
was eventually reached and some of the unreleased music appeared
on the album titled Nirvana, the anniversary box set is no more. This
one case clearly demonstrates how the hostilities have damaged all.
The box set, in all likelihood, would have been a multi-platinum
release, yet the hostility has prevented the label, the artist, and the
fans from sharing in the success of this band’s music. This case is by
no means an isolated instance, either. As this paper has discussed,
several multi-platinum artists have refused to record any new
material for their labels under their original contracts. Therefore, the
dispute is harming the label because some of the biggest artists, who
bring in the largest revenues, have refused to release new music. The
artist is of course harmed, because they have put their careers on hold
over a contract dispute that may take years to resolve. Furthermore,
as the Michael case shows, this layoff period can do serious harm to
the artist’s career.
This is all occurring at a time when the labels are complaining to
Congress that the sale of blank CDs has created open piracy. The
labels blame this piracy for cutting album sales by upwards of twenty
percent. While it is disputed whether or not internet file swapping is
actually causing an increase or a decrease in music sales, one thing is
clear: you cannot sell albums if they are not being recorded. The
recording industry’s open hostilities have created a situation where
the some of the most well known artists are refusing to record under
their oppressive contracts and the labels have refused to give up the
oppressive “take it or leave it” terms. This hostility is damaging
everyone, and it is time for Congress to step in and referee the
dispute.

